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ABSTRACT
Aims To estimate the effect on violence of small changes in closing hours for on-premise alcohol sales, and to assess
whether a possible effect is symmetrical. Design, setting, and participants A quasi-experimental design drawing on
data from 18 Norwegian cities that have changed (extended or restricted) the closing hours for on-premise alcohol
sales.Allchangeswere  2hours.Measurements Closinghoursweremeasuredintermsof thelatestpermittedhour
of on-premise trading, ranging from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. The outcome measure comprised police-reported assaults that
occurred in the city centre between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. at weekends. Assaults outside the city centre during the same
time window should not be affected by changes in closing hours but function as a proxy for potential confounders, and
was thus included as a control variable. The data spanned the period Q1 2000–Q3 2010, yielding 774 observations.
Findings Outcomes from main analyses suggested that each 1-hour extension of closing hours was associated with
a statistically signiﬁcant increase of 4.8 assaults (95% CI 2.60, 6.99) per 100 000 inhabitants per quarter (i.e. an
increase of about 16%). Findings indicate that the effect is symmetrical. These ﬁndings were consistent across three
different modelling techniques. Conclusion In Norway, each additional 1-hour extension to the opening times of
premises selling alcohol is associated with a 16% increase in violent crime.
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INTRODUCTION
Thefactthatalcoholconsumptionplaysasigniﬁcantrole
for violent behaviour [1,2] and that licensed premises are
‘hot spots’ for such behaviour [2–5], suggests that strat-
egies to prevent heavy drinking in pubs and bars are par-
ticularly relevant for curbing violence. Violence in or
around licensed premises varies signiﬁcantly. It tends to
occur more frequently in crowded and noisy establish-
ments and when the overall level of intoxication of
patrons is high [6,7]. While a number of prevention pro-
grammes that aim at reducing sales to intoxicated
patrons and violence in bars by training bar staff may
have some potential [8], in this study we will address
policies to regulate the availability of on-premise drink-
ing, more speciﬁcally in terms of regulation of closing
hours.
Effects of changing on-premise trading hours:
previous research
In line with traditional economic theory on physical
availability and consumption of goods, a fairly extensive
literatureshowsthatrestrictionsonaccesstoalcoholare,
in general, effective in curbing alcohol consumption and
related harm [9,10]. Within this literature some studies
have addressed the impact of restrictions on trading
hours for alcohol (see [11–14] for reviews). While these
studiesprovideempiricalsupportfortheeffectivenessof a
changeintradinghoursof 2hoursormore(see[11,12]),
relatively few studies have addressed smaller changes in
trading hours (i.e. changes of less than 2 hours), and the
ﬁndings from these studies are inconsistent [11].
Only a few studies have assessed the possible effects of
changes in trading hours on violence. Based on four
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in PubMed and Google Scholar (April 2011) we identiﬁed
a total of nine studies in the English language which
had assessed possible effects of changes in on-premise
trading hours on violence (Table 1). Six of these studies
addressed extended trading hours [15–20], whereas
three addressed restrictions in closing hours [21–23].
Overall,theﬁndingsfromthesestudiesarenotconsistent.
Some studies have demonstrated associations in the
expected direction, i.e. an increase in violence rates fol-
lowing increased trading hours and vice versa, whereas
other studies have reported no association or even a
decrease in violence rates with increased trading hours.
We will ﬁrst suggest possible explanations of how
changes in trading hours may affect violence rates and
then address possible methodological explanations for
the inconsistent ﬁndings.
In their study from Australia, Chikritzhs & Stockwell
[20] reported that most of the increase in assaults in or
aroundhotelswithextendedclosinghourswasattributed
to increased alcohol sales, which could be due to an
increase in the number of customers, or in the amount of
alcohol consumed per customer, or both. Studies from
Norway have found that in bars and pubs the general
level of intoxication—and the likelihood that intoxicated
patrons are served—increases by the hour at night-time
[24,25]. While an increase in consumption per customer
increases the risk of violent incidents [6,7], an increase
in the number of customers may imply an increase
in crowdedness, noise and potential provocations, which
are also risk factors for violence in the night-time
economy [6,26]. Another possible explanation is that
extended closing hours may delay the time for visiting
bars and pubs and allow for longer time to ‘pre-drink’ in
private homes, in which case the customers may be more
intoxicatedandmorelikelytobeinvolvedinviolenceinor
aroundbarsandpubs[27].Thus,extendedclosinghours
may lead to an increase in violence rates for several
reasons, due to increased drinking either inside the bars
or during private ‘pre-drinking’, or due to other risk
factors associated with an increase in the number of bar
patrons, or due to combinations of these.
Several methodological aspects are of relevance for
the mixed ﬁndings in previous studies. A signiﬁcant
problem with most of the studies on trading hours and
violence is weak study design and lack of controls (see
Table 1); i.e. we do not know whether observed changes
in violence rates can be attributed to the change in
trading hours or to other factors that may affect the vio-
lence rate. Even in quasi-experimental designs with a
single intervention site and a single control site (as was
the case in two studies [19,23]), it is not obvious that the
observed violence in the control site is an indicator of
what would have happened in the intervention site had
there been no intervention [23]. Violence was assessed
by different measures, which reduces comparability
across the studies, but different types of changes in
trading hours are probably more important. If the above-
mentioned mechanisms are valid, only changes in
trading hours at night-time (i.e. closing hours) are of rel-
evance here. Indeed, among the four studies with stron-
ger designs, three studies addressed changes in closing
hours and all three found associations in the expected
direction [20,22,23].The fourth study addressed a small
extension of opening hours and found no association
between the change in trading hours and violence [19].
In line with these observations, the need for further
empirical studies of the impact of changes in closing
hours on alcohol consumption and related harm has
been stated in the above-mentioned recent literature
reviewsonthistopic[11–13].Inparticular,thefollowing
types of studies have been requested: studies applying
stronger research designs [11–13], studies that relate
closinghourstolevelsof violence[12],studiesthatassess
symmetry in impact of extended versus restricted closing
hours [11] and studies that address the possible impact
of smaller changes (<2 hours) in closing hours [11].The
latter is relevant for two reasons. Smaller changes are
more often politically feasible [28], and it is theoretically
important to assess whether there is a continuous rela-
tionship between availability in terms of trading hours
and alcohol-related harm or some threshold effect. In the
present study we will address all these issues by applying
data from a series of natural experiments on changes in
on-premise closing hours in Norway.
Aims of the study
In Norway, trading hours (for both on-premise and off-
premise alcohol sales) are decided at the municipality
level, yet within national maximum trading hours. The
national ‘normal closing hours’ for on-premise sales are
12 midnight for spirits and 1 a.m. for beer/wine, and the
‘maximum closing hours’ are 3 a.m. for all types of alco-
holic beverages. Patrons are, by national law, allowed to
consume alcohol 30 minutes after the closing hours for
sales. The municipalities may decide to extend or restrict
closing hours as long as they are within the national
‘maximum closing hours’. Over the past decade many
Norwegian municipalities have changed—extended or
restricted—the closing hours for on-premise sales, but
the changes have been relatively minor, typically less
than 2 hours.
These ‘natural experiments’ provide an opportunity
to assess possible consequences of small changes in
on-premise closing hours and thus add to a relatively
meagre literature.The purpose of this study was twofold:
(i)toassesswhethersmallchanges(2hours)inclosing
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violent crime, and (ii) if so, whether the association is
symmetrical (i.e. whether the association between
changes in closing hours and violence is of the same
magnitude when closing hours are restricted compared
to extended).
METHODS
We collected detailed information on closing hours for
on-premise alcohol sales and any changes of these by
telephone interviews and e-mail correspondence with
key informants and access to administrative documents
in the 31 largest cities in Norway. This information com-
prised whether, and in that case when, any change took
effect, the number, type and location of the premises that
wereaffectedbythechange,thereason(s)forthechanges
in closing hours that had occurred and other changes in
regulations concerning on-premise licences.
Closinghoursreferheretothetimeforclosingalcohol
sales and were measured in terms of the latest permitted
trading hour of the night, ranging from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
A closing hour at, for instance, 1.30 a.m. was coded 1.5.
In most cases the change in closing hour occurred at
the very beginning of a new quarter (e.g. 1 July) and
applied to all beverage types and all on-premise licences.
However, in two cities extended closing hours were
granted to some premises over a period before they
applied to all premises, and for this period intermediate
values were applied in order to reﬂect this gradual
change.Moreover,infourcitiesbusyperiods(thesummer
season and the party season before Christmas) were
exemptedfromrestrictedclosinghoursandinthesecases
intermediate values were applied to account for these
exemptions.
The choice of violence indicators was based on the
following: ﬁrst, interviews with key informants in the
selected cities revealed that changes in closing hours
applied almost exclusively to on-premise licences in the
city centres. Secondly, studies from Norway [29–31] and
other countries [32] show that alcohol-related violence
occurs mainly at night-time at weekends. As outcome
measure we thus chose the indicator that should be most
sensitive to changes in closing hours; that is, the number
of assaults reported to the police that occurred in the city
centre at night-time (between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.) at
weekends (Friday–Saturday and Saturday–Sunday). As a
control variable we included assaults outside the city
centre during the same time window. This indicator
should not be affected by changes in closing hours but
function as a proxy for potential confounders. Monthly
data on assaults (provided by the Norwegian Police
Directorate)wereaggregatedtoquarterlytime–seriesand
converted to rates per 100 000 inhabitants.
Thirteen of the cities were excluded from the analyses
for one of the following reasons: (i) lack of information
about closing hours and location of violent crimes
(n = 3); (ii) unreliable data on violent crimes (n = 3); (iii)
changes in closing hours that also affected bars and pubs
outside the city centre (n = 1); and (iv) no change in
closing hours (n = 6). This left us with 18 cities for the
analyses, and with the data spanning the period Q1
2000–Q3 2010, we have a total of 774 observations.
Statistical analyses
We used pooled cross-sectional time–series analysis to
estimate the effect of closing hours on assaults in the city
centre. As described above, the assault rate in the city
periphery was included as a control variable. An obvious
source of bias in such analyses is the possible presence of
unobserved city differences that are linked to the depen-
dent and independent variables. Thus we included city
dummy variables, which means that only the intercity
covariation over time is explored [ﬁxed-effects (FE)
models], thus avoiding the potential bias from the inter-
city correlations. We used the more conservative panel
corrected standard errors [33], and included panel-
speciﬁc parameters for estimating residual autocorrela-
tion (STATA version 11 was used for this analysis). To
assess whether a possible effect of closing hours was
symmetrical,weperformedseparateanalysesof thesetof
cities that had extended (n = 10) or restricted (n = 3) the
closing hours.
As sensitivity tests we analysed the data applying two
other methods.The ﬁrst one was city-speciﬁc time–series
analyses by means of autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) modelling [34]. There were 43 obser-
vations for each city. Visual inspection of the series
revealed that all the assault indicators were trend-free.
This is also consistent with the ﬁnding that the autocor-
relations were generally low and statistically insigni-
ﬁcant. The autocorrelation at lag 1 was statistically sig-
niﬁcant for only three cities (in the range 0.3–0.6), and
no series exhibited any seasonal variation. The analyses
werethusperformedontherawdata,asthesefulﬁlledthe
stationarity requisite of ARIMA. The noise (error) term,
which includes explanatory variables not considered in
the model, is allowed to have a temporal structure that is
modelled and estimated in terms of autoregressive or
moving average parameters. The model residuals should
not differ from white noise; this was tested using the Box–
Ljung Q statistics (SPSS version 17.0 was used for this
analysis). The city-speciﬁc estimates were pooled into an
unweighted average to obtain an overall estimate of the
effect of closing hours on assaults. The standard error
of the pooled estimate was calculated according to the
formula (where n denotes the number of cities):
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Finally, we analysed the data restricted to 2 years; that is,
1 year before and 1 year after the change in closing
hours.The rationale for this method is that the inﬂuence
of extraneous factors is minimized; the downside is, of
course,thelossinpowerentailedbythefewobservations.
In this analysis we regressed the change in city centre
assaults on the change in closing hours, including
change in assaults in the city periphery as control. Thir-
teencitieshadchangedclosinghoursonce,andﬁvecities
twice, yielding 23 observations available for this analysis
(SPSS version 17.0 was used for this analysis).
RESULTS
In 10 of these cities the closing hours were restricted at
one time-point, in three cities/towns the closing hours
were extended, and in ﬁve cities/towns the closing hours
were ﬁrst extended and then restricted (see Table 2 for
details). Moreover, according to our key informants
the licensed premises that were affected by changes in
closing hours were mainly pubs, bars and nightclubs.
There are no indications that there were other changes
concerning on-premise licences which were likely to
have affected the outcome measure. While stated
reasons for extensions of closing hours were either not
given or were to serve industry interests, restrictions in
closing hours were generally on the grounds that this
would curb violence and public nuisance, often on the
initiative of the police.
The outcome from the FE model (Table 3) suggested
that each 1 hour of extension of closing hours was asso-
ciated with a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the
number of assaults of 4.8 cases per 100 000 inhabitants
per quarter [95% conﬁdence interval (CI): 2.60–6.99].
Takingthemeannumberof theassaultrateintoaccount
(29.2), this implies a relative increase in assaults of 16%
(4.8/29.2 = 0.164) per extra trading hour at night (95%
CI: 9–24%). The estimates from the sensitivity analyses
were also statistically signiﬁcant; 22% per extra hour
according to the pooled ARIMA estimates, and 13% per
extra hour for the change model.
Table 2 Cities subject to changes in closing hours; name, inhabitants in 1000, type and extent of change to closing hours.
City Inh (’) Type of change
Extent of change
in closing hours Additional comments on changes
Arendal 41 Restriction -1.0 (3.00–2.00) Except for summer season
Bergen 252 Both +1.0 (2.00–3.00) Number of premises with extended hours
increased gradually before change
-0.5 (3.00–2.30)
Drammen 61 Extension +0.5 (2.30–3.00)
Fredrikstad 72 Restriction -1.0 (2.30–1.30) Except for summer/busy seasons
Haugesund 33 Restriction -0.5 (1.30–1.00)
Horten 25 Restriction -1.0 (3.00–2.00)
Kongsberg 24 Restriction -1.0 (3.00–2.00)
Kristiansand 80 Restriction -1.0 (3.00–2.00)
Larvik 42 Restriction -0.5 (2.30–2.00)
Lillehammer 26 Extension +1.0 (2.00–3.00) Two nightclubs had extended hours
during the whole period
Molde 24 Both +1.0 (2.00–3.00)
-1.0 (3.00–2.00)
Moss 30 Restriction -0.5 (3.00–2.30)
Sandnes 63 Both +1.5 (1.30–3.00) A few nightclubs had extended hours
during the whole period
-1.5 (3.00–1.30)
Sarpsborg 52 Restriction -1.0 (2.30–1.30) Except for summer/busy seasons
Stavanger 121 Both +1.5 (1.30–3.00) A few nightclubs had extended hours
during the whole period
-1.5 (3.00–1.30)
Trondheim 168 Both +1.0 (2.00–3.00) Number of premises with extended hours
increased gradually before change
-1.0 (3.00–2.00)
Tønsberg 39 Restriction -1.0 (3.00–2.00) Except for summer season
Ålesund 42 Extension +2.0 (1.00–3.00)
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of closing hours is symmetrical, our ﬁndings suggested
that this is indeed the case; the estimated effects of both
extended and restricted closing hours were statistically
signiﬁcantandof thesamemagnitude(Table 4).Theesti-
mated relative effects per hour were in the range 19–21%
in the FE models and 22–24% in the ARIMA models.The
estimates were not statistically signiﬁcantly different; the
t-tests equalled 0.25 and 0.14 for the difference between
the FE estimates and the ARIMA estimates, respectively.
DISCUSSION
By analysing a series of natural experiments of changes
in closing hours for on-premise alcohol sales in Norway,
we found that even small changes ( 2 hours) appear to
have an impact on night-time violence in inner-city
areas. A 1-hour change in closing hours for on-premise
sales was accompanied by an approximately 20% change
in violent crime rates at weekend nights in city centres.
Theseﬁndingsareinlinewithafewpreviousstudieswith
rigorous research design [20,23]; i.e. Chikritzhs & Stock-
well found that a 1-hour extension of closing hours was
accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in night-time
assaults in and around hotels with extended trading
permits [20], and Kypri and co-workers [23] found that a
1.5–2-hours restriction in closing hours was associated
with a signiﬁcant decrease in night-time assaults in the
citycentre.Inthelatterstudy,theinterventioncomprised
othermeasuresaswell,suchaslock-out[23].Itshouldbe
noted that although the ﬁndings point in the same direc-
tion, the magnitude of the estimated impact is not com-
parable across these studies because the interventions
and the outcome measures differ. Moreover, the present
study adds to the literature by demonstrating symmetry
in the impact of changes in closing hours on violence
rates; i.e. a 1-hour extension of closing hours appears to
haveasimilarimpactonviolentcrimeasa1-hourrestric-
tion of closing hours.
Strengths and limitations
The estimates of the impact of a change in closing hours
on reported violence at weekend nights from three differ-
ent analytical approaches were of the same magnitude,
which suggests that the ﬁndings are quite robust. By col-
lecting more detailed information on location, number
and types of premises that were affected by changes in
closing hours, we have probably obtained a more precise
exposure measure and relevant control measure than is
often the case in such studies. We also obtained data on
other simultaneous changes that concern on-premise
licences,butwehadnoindicationsthatanyof thesewere
likely to have confounded the relationship.The pooling of
estimates from many cities most probably countered the
problem of low test power due to a modest number of
assaults in each of the relatively small cities.
Nevertheless, the input series (closing hours) com-
prised some interpolations and thus imprecise measures,
which is likely to imply that the parameter estimates may
Table 3 Estimated effect of restaurant closing hours on assaults
in city centre, including control for assaults in city periphery.
Estimates based on (1) ﬁxed-effects (FE) modelling, (2) pooled
city-speciﬁc ARIMA modelling and (3) change model.
Estimate SE 95% CI P-value
FE model*
Hours 4.80 1.12 2.60, 6.99 <0.001
Control 0.20 0.07 0.07, 0.33 0.002
Pooled ARIMA
Hours 6.31 1.74 2.90, 9.72 <0.001
Control 0.19 0.07 0.05, 0.33 0.007
Change model
Hours 3.94 1.72 0.56, 7.31 0.028
Control 0.92 0.36 0.21, 1.63 0.010
*R2 = 0.450. SE: standard error; CI: conﬁdence interval.
Table 4 Estimated effect of extended and restricted on-premise closing hours on assaults in city centre, including control for assaults
in city periphery. Estimates based on (1) ﬁxed effects (FE) modelling and (2) pooled city-speciﬁc autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) modelling.
Extended closing hours Restricted closing hours
Est SE 95% CI P-value Est SE 95% CI P-value
FE model
Hours 6.22 1.43 3.42, 9.02 <0.001 5.53 2.56 0.51, 10.55 0.031
Control 0.12 0.20 -0.28, 0.51 0.554 0.27 0.08 0.11, 0.43 0.001
Pooled ARIMA
Hours 7.03 2.00 3.11, 10.95 <0.001 6.54 2.92 0.82, 12.26 0.025
Control 0.16 0.20 -0.23, 0.55 0.424 0.26 0.09 0.08, 0.44 0.004
SE: standard error; CI: conﬁdence interval.
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sources (e.g. emergency rooms) would have been valu-
able to validate those from the police reports, but such
data were not available. Other information that would
have been of interest includes intoxication level among
bar patrons and whether the assaults occurred inside
the licensed premises. This could shed more light on
the mechanisms underlying the observed association
between closing hours and violence.
Implications
Changes in closing hours may be considered politically
feasible, as they are easily implemented and sustained
and imply no direct economic costs to the authorities. On
these grounds, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that
even minor restrictions in closing hours for on-premise
alcohol sales could be an attractive measure to curb
night-time assaults in inner city areas. The ﬁndings also
provideevidence-basedargumentsagainsttherelaxation
of the trading hours that is commonly promoted by the
industry. Other possible successful strategies to prevent
violence in the night-time economy, such as the ‘STAD-
project’ in Stockholm [36] and ‘Safer bars program’ in
Toronto [37] may be viewed as attractive supplements to
restricted closing hours, possibly reinforcing the effects
of each other.
Policy makers and other actors in the alcohol policy
arena have often applied simple comparisons of data
before and after a policy change. Corresponding to the
various ﬁndings reported from the studies of the 2003
Licensing Act [16–18], Norwegian media and policy
makers have also reported conﬂicting ﬁndings with
respect to changes in violence rates following changes in
on-premise closing hours in Norwegian cities. The ﬁnd-
ings of this study therefore illustrate the importance
of not drawing conclusions from an intervention in one
small city and of applying a strong design and reliable
measures when evaluating an intervention. Future
research may beneﬁt from supplementary studies that
may shed more light on underlying mechanisms.
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